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This article revisits the role of  war in state development but goes beyond the scope of  
Western European nation states. It focuses on the relationship between political 
disorder and indirect taxation with micro-level evidence in late imperial China. With 
cross-sectional data for 266 prefectures this article employs quantitative methods to 
test the positive link between the warfare during the Taiping Rebellion (the greatest 
threat for the Qing reign) and the rapid rise and pervasive persistence of  autonomous 
self-serving indirect taxation (lijin) institutions. The withering central fiscal role with 
the growing local fiscal-military needs accounted for this change. This article draws 
more economic and political implications by linking local fiscal autonomy to the Late 
Qing industrialization and the development of  representative politics. The results 
demonstrate that the warfare by the Taiping Rebellion provided an unexpected 





Political disorder matters. There is a spectacular literature on the role of  political disorder in 
modern state formation and development (Downing, 1992; Ertman, 1997; Zhao, 2015), and many 
works emphasize how political disorder is conducive to the growth of  fiscal capacity (Brewer, 1988; 
Tilly, 1990; Epstein, 2002). Fiscal capacity, the ability of  a state to extract and redistribute resources, 
is a critical nexus of  both state development and economic growth (Ardant, 1975; Mathias and 
O’Brien, 1976; Besley and Persson, 2011; Dincecco and Katz, 2016; Bardhan, 2016; Johnson and 
Koyama, 2017). Schumpeter (1954) made the ground-breaking contribution by outlining late 
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medieval transitions from the ‘domain state’ to the ‘tax state’ and the European leap from 
feudalism to capitalism. Political scientists and historical sociologists have been echoing this 
German tradition and recognizing the importance of  studying fiscal capacities (Evans et al., 1985; 
Mann, 1986; Finer, 1999). More recently, interactions between political disorder and fiscal 
modernization enter the perspective of  new institutional economists who cultivate considerable 
empirical evidence especially from Western Europe (North and Weingast, 1989; Fratianni and 
Spinelli, 2006; Drelichman and Voth, 2008). 
 
With the European experiences, scholarship agrees on the fundamental role of  frequent wars in 
strengthening the state fiscal capacities and accelerating the making of  modern nation states, and 
there are several widely accepted characteristics for a modern fiscal state: first, a consistent legal 
system and a consolidated monetary and fiscal regime under independent sovereignty; second, 
effective power centralization, a professional taxation bureaucracy with minimal tax-farming; third, 
a broad tax base and more importantly, a credit-based fiscal system with sustainable credit tools 
(Dickson, 1967; O’Brien, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989; Ormrod et al. 1999; Bonney, 1999; 
O’Brien and Hunt, 1999; Dincecco, 2009). 
 
However, there are ongoing debates on fiscal-military state theories, including the validation of  
these criteria and the mechanisms among warfare, fiscal capacity and economic development. 
Firstly, the role of  some intermediate variables in the key narrative is ambiguous from case to case, 
such as an effective legal system (Harris, 2000), professional civil services (Brewer, 1988) and 
property rights protection (Bogart and Richardson, 2009). Secondly, the literature often overlooks 
alternative explanations like technological innovations in accounting systems (Kiser and Kane, 
2001); meanwhile, it investigates few alternative state incomes like monopoly sales (Ogilvie, 1992; 
Johnson and Koyama, 2014). Thirdly, existing works focus dominantly on the revenue side, namely 
the extractive capacity of  a state, while the expenditure such as infrastructure spending is less 
studied (Baugh, 1965; Braddick, 2000; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; Rasul and Rogger, 2016). 
 
Finally, the above framework mainly employs European evidence but revisions with a global 
perspective are lacking. To construct a general framework of  political changes and fiscal 
3 
modernization, numerous scholars provide various and heterogenous African and Asian cases on 
political modernization and fiscal development (Gardner, 2012; He, 2013; Frankema and Van 
Waijenburg, 2014; Van Waijenburg, 2018; Ko et al., 2018). In such diverse cases, the role of  political 
disorder in the strengthening of  fiscal capacities becomes highly contingent as there are more 
complex interactions between fiscal regime and local endowments, cultural and socioeconomic 
conditions, and exogenous shocks such as colonization. A comparative historical perspective 
matters, and the 19th-century China offers us a perfect case to revisit the relationship between 
political disorder and fiscal development. 
 
This article focuses on how the static, centralized and land-tax-based fiscal regime of  the Qing 
Empire (Wang, 1973; Zelin, 1984; Iwai, 2004) was transformed into a responsive, decentralized 
and diverse one after the 1850s (Zhou, 2000; Ni, 2017). Among numerous shocks, including 
international wars and indigenous unrests in the late Qing China, this article highlights the role of  
the Taiping Rebellion (1851-1864) (太平天国运动) in the profound fiscal transitions of  the Qing 
Empire. For over a decade the Taiping rebellious regime disturbed the prosperous Middle and 
Lower Yangzi provinces and its expeditionary forces spread across inland China. This rebellious 
regime was the greatest threat to the Qing reign which led to significant population loss and 
agricultural depression, since when the image of  a self-sufficient giant empire began to fade 
(Wakeman, 1975; Cao, 2001; Kuhn, 2002). 
 
I argue in this article that the Taiping Rebellion triggered the decline of  land taxation and the rise 
of  local indirect taxation, intertwined with pervasive and persistent military and administrative 
decentralization. To suppress the rebels, the Qing central state, with a vulnerable tax base and weak 
imperial army, acquiesced the establishment of  local militias (Luo, 1939; Kuhn, 1980). To finance 
the militias, the local governments bypassed the centralized land taxation system and introduced a 
novel commercial tax (lijin / likin, 厘金 ). This was the first time for the Chinese state to 
institutionalize autonomous commercial taxation at the local level in the long Ming-Qing history 
(1368-1911).2 During the post-Rebellion decades, the self-serving local lijin institutions persisted 
 
2 However, the earlier Song Dynasty (960-1279) never ignored the commercial sectors. Hence Iwai (2004) held no 
doubt about the setbacks of  the Ming-Qing public finance. The prominent Song Empire had an innovative fiscal 
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and provided indispensable fiscal resources for local spending out of  the central control. To sum 
up, rapid growth and resilient persistence of  indirect taxation, the lijin, was linked to the Taiping 
warfare as an exogenous shock, and it remarked the initial endeavours of  the local political powers 
in the making of  a more responsive and sustainable fiscal system. The middle 19th century was an 
era of  chaos, uncertainty, and decentralization, but it was such an era that triggered one of  the 
most profound fiscal institutional transitions in modern Chinese history. 
 
This narrative is documented in qualitative surveys (Wang, 1927; Bill, 1958; He, 1972, 1981; Zhou, 
2006, 2008) while no quantitative breakthroughs at the micro level have been made. In this article 
I employ primary resources and code the Taiping warfare and the lijin taxation with different 
measures for 266 prefectures across the Qing China Proper. With the original dataset I firstly 
examine the randomness of  the Taiping military behaviours at the prefectural level, and then use 
OLS regressions to verify the link from the Taiping warfare to the lijin taxation. I find a positive 
and significant effect of  the Taiping warfare on the lijin taxation at the prefectural level, and the 
results are robust no matter how I change measures or add controls. The magnitude of  this effect 
is considerable. In a baseline regression, large-scale battles between the Taiping and the Qing 
powers for extra three months would bring 0.9 new lijin stations for a prefecture (mean = 2.801). 
This is a huge impact compared with other shocks of  the same era: a 12-year treaty port, forcefully 
opened by the Westerners, would make the same contribution on the scale of  local lijin taxation 
as extra three-month battles would do. 
 
I provide other robustness checks to demonstrate that international wars and natural disasters 
could not explain the rise of  the lijin. Furthermore, I discuss the two-phase development – 
‘expansion’ and ‘persistence’ – of  the lijin taxation during the decades and conclude that an early 
introduction of  the lijin due to warfare led to higher level of  the lijin taxation even after the 
Rebellion. I also examine how the shrinking of  land taxation, as a crucial channel, played a role in 
inducing the lijin and how the lijin effectively mitigated the local fiscal burden. Finally, I present 
 
system, including its dependence on indirect taxes, the unified monetary system, the meritocracy-oriented taxation 
bureaucracy, and the sprouts of  credit instruments with government promotions and involvements (Liu, 2015). 
However, the invasion of  the Mongols and their reign (1271-1368) destroyed the Song achievements and the later 
Ming Empire (1368-1644) rolled back to a static and rigid agrarian mode. 
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evidence on how the lijin was spent at the local level and draw implications on how the lijin 
strengthened the local economic autonomy and political self-determination. The quantitative 
evidence from the Self-Strengthening Movement (1860s-1890s) and the 1908 Provincial 
Parliament Elections implies a positive role of  the lijin in this process. 
 
This article provides fresh perspectives for our understanding of  political disorder and fiscal 
capacity on a global scope, and it speaks to several strands of  the literature. First, existing literature 
has recognized the positive role of  international wars (Brewer, 1988; North and Weingast, 1989; 
Tilly, 1990; Epstein, 2002; Besley and Persson, 2011; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015), but the role of  
internal insurrections – civil wars or rebellions – is in a debate. Besley and Persson (2008) propose 
a negative role and Cárdenas et al. (2014) provide Colombia’s evidence; however, Rodríguez-
Franco (2016) considers the stance of  local elites and constructs a framework to show how internal 
conflicts foster taxation, which is also supported by Slater (2010) and Ch et al. (2018). This article 
offers an influential Chinese historical case, the Taiping Rebellion, to show how an internal shock 
was conducive to fiscal institutional changes in a positive sense. Given the Qing China’s giant size 
with a unified political regime and cultural background, 266 prefectures could provide meaningful 
variation in the severity of  the Taiping warfare and make it possible for us to investigate the 
consequential fiscal outcomes. 
 
Second, the literature proposes that indirect taxation played a role in early modern times but since 
the 20th century direct taxation has been increasingly important (North and Weingast, 1989; Besley 
and Persson, 2013). However, for the late imperial China with the ‘mandate of  heaven’ (Brandt et 
al., 2014) as the legitimacy, the merits of  indirect taxation were more meaningful because it 
incurred less tax resistance and was less costly while more responsive to the local economic 
conditions. Therefore, this article suggests that the merits of  direct and indirect taxation are highly 




3 Bernhardt (1992), Yang (2012) and Zhou (2019) contribute greatly to the research on post-Taiping fiscal changes 
of  China from the perspective of  direct taxation (overwhelmingly land taxation). 
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Third, this article revisits the central-local relation issues in a broader context. Recent fiscal capacity 
literature emphasizes the importance of  power centralization and common taxation in the process 
of  fiscal modernization (Epstein, 2002; Drelichman and Voth, 2008; Dincecco, 2009; He, 2013). 
This claim is also contingent. For a giant empire like the Qing China, centralization was not 
necessarily linked to the effectiveness of  the fiscal regime. In fact, during the two centuries before 
the Rebellion, the Qing Empire established a sophisticated hierarchical bureaucracy and the fiscal 
regime was strongly universal and centralized (Wang, 1973). However, centralization in the Qing 
Chinese context led to severe principle-agent problems (Sng, 2014), but decentralization and the 
consequential local autonomy, by contrast, strengthened accountability, enhanced fiscal and 
military capacities and guaranteed the social order at the local level during the mid-19th century.4 
This case inspires us to think of  the trade-off  between centralization and decentralization, a long-
lasting debated topic of  historical and contemporary Chinese studies (Xu, 2011; Brandt et al, 2014; 
Zhou, 2017). 
 
Finally, this article speaks to the literature discussing the trajectory of  modern Chinese history. 
Fairbank (1980) as a key figure highlighted the role of  the Westerners in China’s political and 
economic modernization and interpreted the repertoires of  institutional transitions in China 
merely as responses to the Western shocks, and there is micro-level evidence from this view (Jia, 
2014). However, this article suggests that the indigenous shocks were, if  not more, equally 
important, since the Qing China had its inherent political and economic equilibrium with great 
inertia (Cohen, 1984; Deng, 1999; Motono, 2000). This article adds micro-level evidence to this 
debate from the angle of  fiscal transitions. 
 
The rest of  this article proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides relevant historical backgrounds: the 
rise and fall of  the Taiping Rebellion, the fiscal crisis of  the Qing state and the rise and persistence 
of  the lijin taxation. It also introduces how I construct the dataset for the Taiping warfare and the 
lijin taxation. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategies, gives the results of  baseline regressions 
 
4 The lijin practices in the Late Qing China were not unique in global history. Middleton (2005), Spaulding (2011) and 
Johnson and Koyama (2017) documented in detail the tolls along the River Rhine, which became prevalent after 1648. 
The institutional setting was quite alike as the principalities and powers along the Rhine set toll stations and taxed on 
the goods in transit. After the French Revolution such practices declined (Acemoglu et al., 2011). 
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and launches robustness checks. Section 4 discusses the relevant mechanisms including the 
institutional spillover of  the lijin, the decline of  land taxation and the political and economic 
consequences of  the lijin taxation. Section 5 provides concluding remarks. 
 
 
2. Historical Overview and Data Description 
2.1. The Taiping Rebellion 
A Chronology 
After repeated failures in the Civil Service Examinations, Hong Xiuquan, the founder of  the 
rebellious regime, created an indigenous religious organization, the God Worship Society in 1843, 
and attempted to reconcile Christian doctrines and traditional Chinese secret religions (Spence, 
1996). Within several years the Society absorbed numerous peasants, and military camps were 
established in the mountainous middle Guangxi region.5 In January 1851 Hong declared his 
opposition to the Qing rule in Jintian and the rebels spread quickly and marched towards Hunan 
Province in May 1852 (CMH, 2003). During the second half  of  1852 the rebels blitzed and 
plundered Hunan in a random route and moved northbound without any effective resistance from 
the Qing imperial troops (Luo, 1939). In January 1853 after months of  intense battles, the Taiping 
troops occupied several transportation hubs in the Middle Yangzi region (CMH, 2003). They sailed 
down the Yangzi River and fiercely attacked the downstream ports: Jiujiang and Anqing fell in 
February, and so did Jiangning6 in March, which was set as the capital city of  the nascent Taiping 
regime (FHAC, 1996). 
 
During the next decade the Taiping leadership made arduous efforts in governing the Middle and 
Lower Yangzi regions but power balance between the Taiping and the Qing was constantly shifting. 
It launched seven long-distance marches to control more land and extract labour, grains and 
 
5 In Guangxi the resource conflicts between the Hakka immigrants and the local powers were intense in the 19th 
century. Hong, as a Hakka immigrant, gained wide support from his ethnic group and the Society rapidly became 
strong and popular (Wakeman, 1975; Platt, 2012). Meanwhile Platt (2012) proposed that the local plague in 1850 won 
Hong with greater mass support since the patients believed that the Society would heal them. 
6 Jiangning (江宁) was the name of  the prefecture, where today’s Nanjing (南京, Southern Capital) is located. 
Sometimes it was referred to as Jinling (金陵). Its Taiping name was Tianjing (天京, Heavenly Capital). In this article 
I will use the prefecture’s name Jiangning. 
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properties. Tens of  thousands of  Taiping soldiers were sent to the front line. Due to their anti-
Confucian doctrines and intense plunders, they brought widespread panic and unrest to both 
inland and coastal China. From 1862 the Qing powers began to take hold and regained most 
plundered prefectures (TSU, 2013). In the Taiping capital area, ruthless battles lasted for 27 months 
until the Taiping’s fall in July 1864 (Guo, 1989). Sporadic guerillas fled to the coastal Fujian and 
Guangdong, but all rebels were wiped out within two years by the Qing state (FHAC, 1996). 
 
The Impact of  the Taiping Rebellion on the Qing State and Society 
The Taiping Rebellion was the greatest threat to the Qing reign (Ho, 1959; Wakeman, 1975; Spence, 
1996). It reshaped the Qing political and socioeconomic nature in several ways. Firstly, the 
Rebellion permanently reversed the central-local relations of  the Qing Empire, and the local 
powers became the dominant players in the Late Qing political repertoires. When the Taipings 
were raging over southern China,7 the desperate Qing central state turned to a forced power 
decentralization. Provincial governors and local gentry were granted with the greatest autonomy 
of  setting up militias and building fortifications (Kuhn, 1980).8 Meanwhile, as the Civil Service 
Examinations were suspended in the war zones, powerful governors hired think tanks and 
appointed officials, through which they built up personal networks and weakened the central 
authority (Luo, 2007). The Taiping Rebellion accelerated the collapse of  the traditional centralized 
administrative system, and decentralization persisted for decades even after the rebels were wiped 
out in the late 1860s. Lack of  central authority with the acquiesced self-determination of  local 
defensive actions is a key condition to understand the political and fiscal changes by the Rebellion 




7 The Qing central government was unable to cope with such large-scale chaos because its military and administrative 
systems were strictly hierarchical and the decision-making process was highly centralized. The formal troops received 
commands from the center and fought independently. The autonomous coordination among provinces was minimal, 
and a local troop had no incentive to cross the provincial border even if  it could eliminate the rebels (Wakeman, 1975; 
Kuhn, 1980). 
8 This was not the first time for the Qing state to organize militias to fight against insurrections: they did so in 1796 
at the outbreak of  the White Lotus Rebellion. However, the 1796 Rebellion was not as devastating as the Taiping one, 
and the Qing state took the military power back when the White Lotus powers were eliminated. In the 1850s the local 
powers re-employed their earlier expertise of  training militias but for this time the autonomy was never returned to 
the center. 
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Secondly, the direct economic impact of  the Taiping Rebellion was pervasive and devastating. 
Millions died of  the armed conflicts, massacres, and famines.9 In Anqing as an example, fierce 
battles lasted 18 months and both sides invested over 100,000 soldiers, ending up with the Qing 
victory and a massacre to its enemies (Platt, 2012). In the Taiping capital area from 1856 to 1860 
the Taiping troops destroyed two major Qing camps near the Yangzi River, each for twice; during 
the battles the Qing side suffered over 10,000 casualties. The final siege and anti-siege over the 
capital lasted for two years while each side sent more than 100,000 soldiers (FHAC, 1996). Great 
loss of  population led to insufficient labour inputs and a sharp decline of  primary sector. 
Meanwhile, the Taiping regime greatly disturbed the long-distance transport networks, especially 
the Yangzi River and the Great Canal, which severely challenged the rigid and hierarchical grain 
and salt transport system. After 1852 most southern cities were under the shadow of  the Taipings 
who seriously undermined the Qing market integration (Ni, 2017). Economic shocks by the 
Rebellion, especially the agricultural recession and the setback of  long-distance transport, lay 
foundations for the fiscal transitions. 
 
Finally, the Taiping regime per se was destructive due to its short sight. Within its territory, the 
taxation, land redistribution and official recruitment were highly coercive and unsustainable due 
to its intense military activities. The Taiping fiscal sources consisted of  confiscation, forced 
‘donations’ (捐) by mass people, and taxation (Mi, 1983). The Taiping regime generated very 
limited revenue and no reliable estimations can be made from archives. In short, its destructive 
and one-off  extraction further impeded economic growth while available resources were invested 
in its military actions. 
 
Quantifying the Taiping Impact at the Prefectural Level 
The Taiping Rebellion was not alone; the 19th century witnessed the withering of  the Qing state as 
the low-cost political system with a small bureaucracy retreated from many public affairs (Deng, 
2012). Rebels took actions in a spontaneous, simultaneous, independent and disordered way, 
arising from the nomadic Manchuria and the north-western China to the peripheral southwestern 
 
9 The estimations of  population loss from the Taiping Rebellion vary on a wide range – 100 million by Ho (1959), 
73.3 by Cao (2001) and 46.9 to 95.1 by Li and Lin (2015). 
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hinterlands. Figure A.7 maps the spatial distribution for them. Among them however the Taiping 
Rebellion was distinctive among all others of  the same era. Spatially the Taipings impacted all nine 
‘macroregional’ systems10 while others covered three at most; temporally the Taiping Rebellion 
lasted for a rather long time. Hence its nationwide impact was well recognized. However, the 
Taiping troops impacted on prefectures in various ways, but the significant spatial variation is 
greatly under-explored. This article investigates primary resources and quantifies the Taiping 
impact at the prefectural level. 
 
The main data sources for this article are Guo (1989) and FHAC (1996). Guo’s (1989) atlas records 
the geographical information on the Taiping military actions from 1850 to 1866, and FHAC (1996) 
compiles the Qing official records – edicts and memorials – about the suppression of  the Rebellion, 
from which I infer the severity of  each armed conflict.11 Appendix A provides an example of  how 
a recorded Taiping action is located and quantified. Through sorting and locating all Taiping 
military actions for over a decade, this article measures in four ways the Taiping impact on 266 
prefectures in all 18 provinces of  China Proper: a dummy, a dummy that only considers large 
battles, a duration that counts the number of  months in war, and a severity score that incorporates 
all disturbances and weighs their importance. Table 1 and Figure 1 provide a summary of  the 
calculating methods and visualization on a national scale, respectively. Descriptive statistics are in 
Table A.4. Compared with the measures in previous studies, these four measures consider temporal 
and spatial changes for 266 prefectures thoroughly and quantify the Taiping impact in a more 
comprehensive way as every single battle, with its duration and severity, is tracked. 
 
2.2. The Rise of  Indirect Taxation and Its Persistence 
The Fiscal Crisis of  the Qing Empire 
A fiscal crisis for the Qing Empire became evident since 1851 from both revenue and expenditure 
sides. Regarding revenue, all three major tax sources shrunk because of  warfare. The large-scale 
 
10 Skinner (1985) divided China Proper (Manchuria not included) into nine relatively self-sufficient economic systems 
which had their own economic cores with most economic activities confined within. They are Northwest, North, 
Upper Yangzi, Middle Yangzi, Gan Yangzi, Lower Yangzi, Yungui, Lingnan and Southeast Coast. 
11 Meanwhile I use Yi and Zhu (1896/1965), Zhang (1984), Hua (1991), CMH (2003) and TSU (2013) for a cross 
check. 
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chaos brought great uncertainty to agricultural production in the warzone and severely restricted 
the scale of  land taxation. Domestic customs tax and salt tax systems were also disrupted due to 
the halt of  long-distance trade and the decline of  licensed salt production (Chen, 1997). Meanwhile 
the warfare broke down the remittance system and greatly undermined the coordinating capacity 
of  the central state.12 Figure 2 outlines the pre-Rebellion fiscal revenue structure and indicates 
how the financial constraint arose instantly since the outbreak of  the Taiping Rebellion. For the 
1840s the Qing state had collected 35 million silver taels annually. Land tax had accounted for over 
60% (Wang, 1973); however, during the Rebellion annual land tax revenue was nearly halved. Salt 
tax revenue had accounted for 13% and it almost diminished in the late 1850s. Customs taxation, 
another 16%, was less impacted: although the levies on domestic long-distance trade declined, 
international trade backed up. In short, in the middle 1850s, the annual fiscal shortage of  the Qing 
state was approximately 15 million taels – 45% of  its pre-war annual revenue. 
 
Meanwhile, the Taiping Rebellion transformed the Qing expenditure structure significantly. For 
the previous peacetime, annual government expenditure had been 31 to 38 million silver taels, over 
70% to be military spending and government official salaries (Chen, 2010). Since the 1850s 
temporary military spending took a rapidly growing share. I take the number from the ex post 
official memorials: the 14-year suppression cost the Qing government 171 million silver taels (Peng, 
1981; Tang and Liu, 1987). Ceteris paribus the annual extra-budget military expenditure reached 
12 million taels. 
 
For the decades before the Rebellion the Qing public finance was simple, static and rigid. Tax 
sources were limited but stable, and the expenditure was always restrained on a moderate level to 
make ends meet; the silver reserve at the Board of  Revenue was at a low level,13 summarized by 
Iwai (2004) as ‘quotaism’ (原额主义 ). However, this system was vulnerable when facing 
unexpected shocks. The Taiping Rebellion unprecedentedly brought an annual fiscal shortage of  
 
12 For example, in 1852 the Guangxi Governor complained about the slow and insufficient intergovernmental 
transfers (FHAC, 1996; Ni, 2017). Another challenge was the unapproved local retainment of  the tax revenues. During 
the peace time provinces had had to transfer most tax revenues to the center (Wang, 1973). However, the records in 
June 1853 indicated that provinces under warfare started retaining various revenues for military use, while the 
coordination from the center became absent (FHAC, 1996). 
13 At the outbreak of  the Rebellion the silver reserve was fewer than 3 million taels (Shi, 2009). 
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26 million silver taels according to above estimation, which suddenly worsened the balance sheet 
and pushed the Qing public finance into an irreversible crisis. In 1853 the central state promulgated 
several urgent edicts to push all its organs to ‘take prompt actions to raise funds regardless of  
means’ (无论何款，迅速筹备) (Chen, 1997) but the top-down ways were all a cliché. Imperial 
title sales14 had been the most frequently applied method to cover the deficit but it was one-off  
as an individual only paid once in lifetime. In the pre-Rebellion decades, the Qing state had sold 
vacancies too frequently – almost every two years from 1821 to 1849 – and exhausted the demand 
of  the masses (Ni, 2013); furthermore, the increasing number of  sales diluted the value of  degrees 
and positions and made them less attractive. Hence this solution was abandoned after 1853. 
Another major solution by the central state was to issue the ‘big cash’ (大钱) by the debasement 
of  copper coins and issuance of  paper notes, which immediately received negative responses from 
the financial market.15 All ‘big cash’ was soon depreciated to its original value and through the 
decade the Qing state failed to make any profits. 
 
The Bottom-up Emergence of  Indirect Taxation ‘Lijin’ and Its Feasibility 
The workable solution was introduced by local officials. In March 1854, a memorial from Lei 
Yixian, the handler of  Yangzhou military affairs (帮办扬州军务) and assistant minister of  the 
Board of  Penalty (刑部侍郎), caught the attention of  the central government, in which he argued 
how he established an indirect taxation system in Yangzhou, a stressful prefecture under the 
shadow of  the Taiping regime. In the summer of  1853 Lei’s army was in a financial crisis as the 
warfare became intense. Without notifying his superior, in August he focused on the grain sector 
in the towns along the Lixia River and levied grain stores the ‘lijin’ (厘金), 1% of  transaction 
amount (FHAC, 1996). 16  This alternative immediately mitigated Lei’s financial crisis and he 
promoted this system along the north bank of  the Yangzi River by setting lijin stations at the 
 
14 Passing the Civil Service Exams were the only opportunity of  upward social mobility for the mass commoners, and 
successful gentries with a degree or official title were exempted from land taxation and criminal penalty (Chang, 1955). 
The imperial title sales provided an attractive shortcut (Xu, 1950). 
15 The Qing state did not tie paper notes to the silver reserves due to the lack of  financial knowledge, and the newly 
minted copper coins had far less intrinsic value than their face value (He, 2013). The public trust was destroyed at the 
moment of  their issuance (Peng, 1983). Private workshops minted the ‘big cash’ by melting the original ones; 
pawnshops and private banks were closed; capital fled, and price level experienced a five-fold jump in the capital city 
(Ni, 2017). 
16 For the name ‘lijin’ and its historical ambiguity in Chinese, see Zhou (2006). 
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transport nexuses and adopting it to other sectors. In November 1854 Lei persuaded his superior 
Shengbao, imperial envoy (钦差大臣), cabinet member (内阁大学士) and minister of  the Board 
of  Rites (礼部尚书), to send memorials to the Emperor Xianfeng. Those memorials changed the 
original rigid, static and centralized fiscal regime and gained legitimacy for the lijin institutions at 
all local levels. This sudden but profound breakthrough witnessed the first time for the 
comprehensive indirect taxation to be acquiesced by the Qing state during its two-century rule. 
Within several years all 18 provinces established their own lijin institutions.17 Figure 4 outlines 
how the lijin institutions spread nationwide, and Figure 2 illustrates how the considerable lijin 
revenue made up for the extra-budget needs since 1853. At the end of  the Rebellion the lijin 
revenue reached an annual level of  18 million silver taels – 70% of  the annual fiscal shortage. 
 
The pervasive introduction of  the lijin is a crucial step for the Qing state to strengthen its fiscal 
capacity. There was indirect taxation in the pre-Rebellion era, but as a regime for ‘maintenance 
rather than maximal efficiency’ (Strauss, 1998), taxes on commercial activities were extremely light. 
Previous customs tax, as a central tax, had taken a share of  16% in total fiscal revenue, and if  we 
exclude international customs tax, the domestic part became minimal. There were about 50 
domestic customs (常关) to tax on domestic goods in a giant empire with over 400 million people. 
Domestic customs taxed on long-distance trade, while the short-distance trade was neglected by 
the central state.18 Figure A.8 shows the uneven distribution of  domestic customs – even for some 
provincial capitals the nearest customs were over 300 kilometres away. Therefore, although the 
early Qing times (1640s-1840s) witnessed explosive population boom and impressive Smithian 
growth (Von Glahn, 2016), the incremental part of  the national economy, especially secondary and 
tertiary sectors, was out of  the scope of  the Qing regime. The Taiping Rebellion was an unexpected 
shock that led to such a transition: faced with severe local fiscal constraints, local officials 
 
17 The lijin practices became flexible when introduced to other provinces. In a few provinces the lijin was a levy on 
stationary producers and traders, but on a national scale the transit lijin (通过地厘金) was a major form: the local 
governments set stations at the market hubs, gateways of  towns, and nexuses of  roads and waterways and mainly 
levied on goods in transit. 
18 There had been miscellaneous taxes targeting at merchants such as brokerage tax and pawnshop tax. However, they 
had accounted for less than 10%, and we have a limited knowledge of  them as tax farming had been popular (Luo, 
1936). Furthermore, from the 1800s to 1840s several prestigious officials including Zeng Guofan and Lin Zexu 
proposed the merits of  indirect taxation, but no changes were made by the throne (Luo, 1936). For the rationale of  
the Qing central state and the reluctance to changes, see Ma and Rubin (2019). 
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reasonably turned to the under-taxed short-distance trade for alternative incomes. For them this 
was a safe solution because three major traditional tax sources, owned by the central state, remained 
intact while the lijin system cultivated an independent but more lucrative field at a local level. 
 
Meanwhile, the nature of  the warfare made it workable. The Taiping regime never established a 
closed border, and its expansion strategies were highly contingent; Appendix B provides a survey. 
The Taiping-ruled cities and towns were weakly linked by roads and waterways, while they had no 
effective control over the vast rural society where the local commerce persisted (Spence, 1996). 
Cities and towns per se provided limited labour, grains and weapons, while rural China contained 
a great number of  scattered but self-sustained economic systems (Skinner, 1977). Hence the local 
Qing officials were able to utilize the available resource – levies on the flexible short-distance trade 
– to enhance their fiscal and military capacities continuously under the Taiping shadow. 
 
The Persistence of  Local Indirect Taxation after the Rebellion 
The lijin taxation was so profitable that after the Rebellion it was preserved by local officials at all 
levels while the central and local fiscal conflicts were increasingly evident. During the post-
Rebellion decades (1870s-1910s) the Qing central state took various measures to consolidate its 
control over the lijin but all ended up in failures due to the strong local resistance. The local lijin 
institutions became permanent in the name of  ‘post-war recovery and local defense’ (Rowe, 1992). 
The persistence of  indirect taxation reshaped the structure of  the Qing fiscal revenue and Figure 
2 provides an overview. Although land and salt taxation recovered, the fiscal revenue structure in 
the last decades of  the 19th century showed a sharp contrast to the 1840s’ one. Salt tax was stable; 
customs tax and miscellaneous taxes experienced moderate growth in volume; the proportion of  
land tax revenue fell from approximately 60% in the 1840s to 40% in the 1890s – they were all 
central taxes. By contrast, the lijin since its emergence played an increasingly important role: it took 
a stable share of  approximately 20% in the 1890, and this number was zero in 1852. Furthermore, 
the overall annual fiscal revenue, central and local in total, doubled by reaching 80 million silver 
taels in the 1890s. Regarding the incremental part, the autonomous and independent local lijin 
taxation made significant contributions. 
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The lijin system persisted at the local level for eight decades – even after the Qing Empire’s fall – 
because of  its incentive structure and accountability. Firstly, the lijin institutions were self-serving, 
with great autonomy to set stations, hire employees and adjust tax rates. Central supervision was 
absent while the powerful local incentives brought unexpectedly high efficiency and flexibility. The 
personnel management was independent: the bureaus and stations bypassed the Civil Service 
Examinations and hired employees without degrees (Chen, 2015). Official collection instead of  
tax farming dominated (Luo, 1936) to prevent involution (Duara, 1991). Regarding operational 
cost, most provinces used less than 10% of  the tax revenue to run the system, which was much 
more cost-saving than running the regular bureaucracy (Chen, 2010). During the 1880s each 
Middle Yangzi province (Jiangxi, Hunan and Hubei) spent about 110,000 taels to run the lijin 
apparatus annually, which could pay for salaries of  only six high-ranked central officials like Zeng 
Guofan (Zelin, 1984). 
 
Secondly, compared with direct taxation and monopoly sales – the Qing central tax sources, 
indirect taxation was more responsive to local economy and more legitimate. The ‘mandate of  
heaven’ (Brandt et al., 2014) was the orthodox legitimacy, and there had been no political 
enlightenment of  ‘no taxation without representation’; tax resistance was always one of  the 
greatest threats to the Qing reign (Wong, 1997). For the 19th-century China with an agrarian 
economy and a small bureaucracy, direct taxation limited its fiscal capacity due to low flexibility, 
limited growth potential and high costs of  statistics and operations. By contrast, indirect taxation 
on transported goods had greater growth potential and much lower costs. More importantly it 
matched the local military needs and mitigated the risk of  tax resistance by the mass people.19 
 
19 Lei’s memorial (FHAC, 1996) exhibited surprisingly progressive economic thoughts on indirect taxation. Firstly, he 
argued that indirect taxation was ‘steady and permanent’ (细水长流，源远不竭). ‘The title purchase revenue from 
rich households was limited while commercial goods transport was infinite.’ (富家之捐输有尽，而商贾之转运无
穷) Secondly, the lijin revenue was more flexible and responsive. ‘Fewer profits (for a merchant) meant fewer taxes 
while more meant more taxes. The amount of  lijin was totally determined by the transaction amount.’ (入少则捐少，
入多则捐多，均视其买卖所入为断) Thirdly, there was a pulling effect as the levied merchants transferred the 
burden to customers. ‘Although we urged the merchants to pay, the taxes came from the customers… so that we levied 
on the mass people in an invisible way without resistance.’ (况名为行铺捐厘，其实仍出自买客……所谓征于无
形而民不觉者也). Finally, since the lijin was for suppressing the Rebellion, the obligation was widely recognized by 
taxpayers. ‘Gentries and mass people valued the security of  their properties, and the suppression of  the Rebellion was 
closely related to everyone’s welfare. This made the lijin taxation smooth.’ (绅民身家念重，痛痒相关，故臣之劝
捐，视各处较易) 
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Quantifying the Lijin Taxation at the Prefectural Level 
I map the rise and persistence of  the lijin taxation at the prefectural level with primary resources. 
Unlike most Qing fiscal records well kept at the central level, the lijin records are inconsistent and 
incomplete as local governments were unwilling to disclose their performances. Information 
asymmetry brings difficulty to this article. 
 
This article tries to make a breakthrough by investigating the information revealed by the Financial 
Reports (《财政说明书》) published from 1908 to 1911. In the last three years of  the Qing Dynasty, 
the new Board of  Finance launched a series of  fiscal reorganization campaign as part of  the 
Constitutional Reform. Ad hoc Bureaus of  Fiscal Reorganization undertook unprecedentedly 
detailed surveys in provinces to uncover the black box of  local public finance. Their output, the 
Financial Reports, compiled by BL (2006) and Chen (2015), revealed various information on the 
Late Qing local public finance including the lijin operations. I will also use information in Luo 
(1936). There are two main challenges when I utilize the materials. Firstly, it is hard to establish a 
yearly prefectural panel dataset because the Financial Reports only reflected the situation in 1908. 
Secondly, very few provinces recorded annual prefectural lijin revenue data.20 
 
For the first challenge, I will make most of  the Financial Reports and establish a cross-sectional 
dataset. Figure 2 exhibits the yearly amount of  national lijin revenue and implies that the lijin 
persisted well from the 1860s to the 1900s, so that my cross-sectional dataset, although built with 
the 1900s information, will reflect a reliable and consistent image of  the lijin operations across 
China. For the second challenge – lack of  revenue data – I count and locate the lijin bureaus and 
stations nationwide, the details of  which were fortunately well recorded in the Financial Reports. The 
number of  bureaus and stations is a reasonable measure of  the local lijin taxation scale, for two 
reasons. First, the local lijin institutions were spontaneous and independent, without any planning 
or intervention from the throne or the Board of  Revenue. Second, since the lijin was a levy on 
goods in transit, the geographical distribution of  bureaus and stations must be rational. They 
needed to capture the flows of  goods. Workloads of  bureaus and stations must be comparable – 
 
20 Among 18 provinces in China Proper, only three, Jiangsu, Zhejiang and Shaanxi had cross sectional records on the 
prefectural annual lijin revenue for a certain year of  the 1900s. 
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those with light workloads might be abolished while a busy one would be split into two new ones. 
Table A.3 verifies the comparability of  the sizes of  the lijin stations among and within provinces 
by reviewing existing records. 
 
I establish a cross-sectional dataset for 266 prefectures, and for each I obtain the numbers of  
provincial bureaus, main stations and additional stations.21 Figure 3 provides visualization on a 
national scale in density (weighted by land size). A province owned one to three provincial bureaus, 
which mainly took managerial responsibilities so that their sizes were not significantly larger than 
its subordinates and there was no siphon effect on the lower level. Under provincial bureaus there 
were main stations, the major touchpoints for taxpayers. Besides, since some regions had complex 
geographical conditions there were additional stations under certain main stations. The numbers 
of  additional stations varied significantly among and within provinces, and four provinces lacked 
relevant records. Therefore, I will mainly employ the density of  main stations as the key dependent 
variable. 
 
Furthermore, I construct two alternative measures of  prefectural lijin taxation for robustness 
checks. The first considers estimating the number of  the lijin employees in a prefecture. With the 
numbers in Table A.3 I assume that each provincial bureau had 30 employees and each main station, 
with a certain number of  additional ones, had 35 employees in the south-eastern coastal provinces 
and 18 in the remaining provinces.22 The second alternative measures annual lijin revenue for a 
prefecture. From Zhou (2011) I obtain the average annual lijin revenue for each province from 
1890 to 1899 as the data are complete. Within a province I assume that the workload for each 
employee was similar, and then the prefectural annual lijin revenue should be proportional to the 




21 Different names like ‘bureau’(局), ‘station’ (厂) and ‘checkpoint’ (卡), were used in different provinces. For 
simplicity, this article only uses the names ‘provincial bureau’, ‘main station’ and ‘additional station’. 
22 I do not use the information on additional stations as four provinces lacked relevant records. I assume that 
additional stations were surrounding a main one in cluster, and my estimation for the main stations’ number of  
employees, 35 or 18, has already considered the clustered additional ones. The variation within and among provinces 
is reliable, and the estimated national number of  lijin employees, 21206, is consistent with Luo (1936). 
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Finally, the Financial Reports highlight the starting year for a prefecture to introduce lijin so I establish 
a rough panel dataset for prefectures with the lijin taxation in dummy, and Figure 4 exhibits how 
the lijin spread in decades at the prefectural level. This process can be clearly divided into two 
phases, expansion and persistence. In the first phase (1853-1864), its rapid and steady growth was 
facilitated by the fiscal need to suppress the Taipings. During this decade 147 prefectures 
introduced the lijin, accounting for 70% of  total number of  prefectures with the lijin. In the second 
phase (1865-1900s), the lijin institutions showed a great ratchet effect. Institutions continued 
spreading but in a fine-tuning way. This is consistent with Figure 2: in the ‘expansion’ phase, the 
annual national lijin revenue increased from 0.4 to 17.6 million silver taels, with an annual growth 
rate of  46%; in the ‘persistence’ phase, this number maintained the level of  18 to 20 million with 
very minor volatility. This evidence makes my cross-sectional dataset plausible. 
 
Motivational Evidence 
This part provides some motivational evidence about the link between the Taiping Rebellion and 
the lijin taxation. Figure A.9 employs the yearly provincial panel data for the lijin revenue (Zhou, 
2011) and presents the temporal pattern of  the selected provinces, four severely impacted in the 
Middle and Lower Yangzi region and four lightly impacted in the north. The dichotomy is 
suggestive, but the gap between two groups is striking for both overall and per capita levels. More 
importantly, the divergence arose in not the ‘persistence’ but the ‘expansion’ phase. Due to the 
intense Taiping warfare, the severely impacted provinces had much higher growth rates of  the lijin 
revenue during the Rebellion and the high level persisted for decades; for the northern provinces, 
no clear two-phase pattern can be seen. 
 
Besides, Figure A.10 employs the cross-sectional data and plots the lijin taxation to the Taiping 
impact at the prefectural level. It uses different measures for both lijin taxation and Taiping impact, 




3. Empirical Strategies and Main Results 
3.1. Baseline Regressions 
In this part I use cross-sectional data for 266 prefectures to study the impact of  the Taiping 
Rebellion on the lijin taxation. The specification is 
 
Lijini = β0 + β1 Taipingi + W’i β + εi 
 
where i denotes prefectures. I use several measures introduced in Table 1 for dependent and key 
independent variables, Lijini and Taipingi respectively. W’i consists of  several sets of  control 
variables that may affect the lijin taxation. First, the initial geographical conditions including access 
to the coast, the Yangzi River and the Great Canal, the log of  land size, and the latitude. Second, 
the initial political and economic conditions predetermined before 1850, including the log of  
population in 1820, and the distances to the nearest provincial capital and domestic customs. Third, 
other post-1850 disturbances which might shape the local lijin institutions such as the duration of  
foreign treaty ports and dummies for other rebellions of  the same era. Calculating methods for 
control variables are in Table 2, and Table A.4 presents descriptive statistics. εi denotes the error 
term. For all regressions the standard error is robust and clustered at the provincial level. β1 is the 
coefficient of  our interest and I expect it to be positively significant. 
 
This article mainly uses OLS regressions to verify the impact of  the Rebellion on the lijin, and the 
exogeneity of  the Taiping military behaviours to the local economic conditions is an underlying 
assumption. Appendix B provides several qualitative narratives on the randomness of  the Taiping 
marching routes. Meanwhile, with the established prefectural dataset I regresses the different 
measures of  the Taiping impact to the pre-Rebellion geographical, political and economic 
conditions and finds that no such factors are consistently significant. Furthermore, I count the 
monthly battles between the Taiping and the Qing during 1853 and 1864 and construct count 
variables such as Taiping Duration (Jan.1853-Dec.1854), Taiping Duration (Jan.1855-Dec.1856), etc. for 
each prefecture; then I use Poisson regressions to check whether locations of  the earlier Taiping 
battles could predict the ones in years later and find that the prediction power is extremely weak. 
Results in Appendix B support the exogeneity of  the Taiping Rebellion. 
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Regarding the key specification, the baseline regression results are shown in Table 3. I use the 
density of  main lijin stations as the dependent variable and four measures of  the Taiping impact 
as key independent variable. Columns 1 to 4 are the results without controls. Columns 5 to 8 add 
the control variables for initial geographical conditions and pre-Rebellion political and economic 
factors. Columns 9 to 12 add further controls for other post-1850s shocks that might push or 
hamper the indirect taxation. All columns give significant coefficients for the Taiping impact no 
matter which measure I use, and the key coefficients become smaller when I add more controls. 
 
With the fitted models I estimate the marginal effect of  the Taiping Rebellion on the lijin taxation. 
In Column 12 of  Table 3 for example, the coefficient for Taiping Severity is 0.239: if  there were 
large-scale battles between the Taiping and the Qing powers for extra three months, the density 
of  main lijin stations would increase by 0.072 (0.239*3*100/1000); considering the median 
prefectural land size to be 12,140 km2, such extra warfare would bring about 0.9 new main stations. 
This is considerable: Table A.4 implies that about half  of  the prefectures in my sample had no 
more than two main lijin stations.23 I take control variables for a comparison. In the same column, 
the coefficient for Treaty Port Duration is 0.006, significant at 1% level: if  there was a treaty port for 
12 years, the density of  the main stations would increase by 0.126 exactly. Therefore a 12-year 
treaty port and 3-month intense Taiping warfare would make the same contribution on the local 
lijin taxation. 
 
Besides, we should notice in Columns 5 to 12 that some initial conditions always played a strikingly 
strong role: if  a prefecture was by the Yangzi River or the Great Canal, the density of  the main 
stations would increase by at least 0.156, which means 1.89 new main stations – a huge effect given 
the median among prefectures was two main stations. 
 
3.2. Robustness Checks 
As a robustness check I replace the density of  main stations and consider the weighted number 
of  the lijin employees or annual revenue to examine whether the Taiping impact is significant. 
 
23 Put it another way: a one-standard-deviation increase in the Taiping Severity indicates a 0.057 increase for the density 
of  main lijin stations (mean = 0.261). 
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These are still OLS regressions at the prefectural level. Results are given in Table 4 and I only 
present regressions with Taiping Severity as the independent variable.24 Columns 1 and 3 do not 
include controls and Columns 3 and 4 do. All key coefficients are significant and those with 
controls are smaller.25 Similarly I can estimate similar marginal effects from Columns 2 and 4 of  
Table 4. In Column 2, the coefficient of  Taiping Severity is 9.924, and extra 3-month battles would 
increase the weighted amount of  the lijin staff  by 2.977; considering the median land size of  a 
prefecture, there would be 36 new lijin employees – approximately the number of  employees for 
one main station. In Column 4, the coefficient of  Taiping Severity is 16.350, and extra 3-month 
battles would increase the weighted annual lijin revenue by 4.905, which meant an extra revenue 
of  60,000 silver taels per year. This can be a considerable independent revenue for a prefecture. 
The land tax dataset (Liang, 1980) implies that the average prefectural land tax revenue in 1820 on 
a national scale was 186,000 taels, and even in the richest Lower Yangzi region, the provincial 
capitals Jiangning and Hangzhou collected only 556,000 and 708,000 taels respectively. Hence the 
lijin taxation provided a stable and considerable revenue for local fiscal budget which went 
completely out of  the central control. 
 
Furthermore, I am concerned about whether other historical changes instead of  the Taiping 
Rebellion triggered the rise of  the lijin, and regressions in Table 5 use those changes to predict the 
density of  main lijin stations.26 Since the 1850s the reign of  the Qing Empire was threatened by 
its defeats in several international wars, resulting in the forced opening of  treaty ports and huge 
amounts of  indemnities (Fairbank, 1980). During the 2nd Opium War (1856-1860), the Sino-French 
War (1883-1885) and the Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), intense battles by both armies and navies 
might bring rapidly growing military spending, and Columns 1 to 4 consider the role of  them. 
Columns 1 to 3 use dummies for a specific war and Column 4 counts the total number of  wars at 
the prefectural level. As they indicate, no international wars explain the variation of  lijin taxation, 
indicating the role of  wars to be ‘the flies on an elephant’ (Motono, 2000). Column 5 considers 
 
24 Using other Taiping measures gives robust results. 
25 In Column 2 of  Table 4, a one-standard-deviation increase in the Taiping Severity indicates a 2.362 increase for the 
weighted number of  lijin employees (mean = 7.704). In Column 4, a one-standard-deviation increase in the Taiping 
Severity indicates a 3.891 increase for the weighted annual lijin revenue (mean = 7.903). 
26 Using Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees or Weighted Annual Lijin Revenue as the dependent variable gives robust 
results. Even if  I do not include any controls, none of  the columns give significant positive results. 
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another factor that frequently led to heavier taxation in the Qing China – natural disasters. I 
construct an indicator to measure the overall severity of  natural disasters from 1851 to 1911 by 
compiling the data in CAMS (1981). Table 2 introduces the calculating method. I regress the 
density of  main lijin stations to it and find the key coefficient significantly negative. This may 
contradict our intuition as natural disasters usually led to more irregular spending on disaster relief  
(Will et al., 1991), which called for more fiscal revenue by the state. However, the disasters like 
floods and droughts in fact impeded the lijin taxation because the lijin was a levy on the goods in 
transit and it required the transport network to be well maintained. This justifies the negative role 




After establishing the link from the Taiping Rebellion to the lijin taxation, this section verifies the 
mechanisms in this historical narrative. Firstly, I provide evidence for the two-phase development 
of  the lijin taxation, ‘expansion’ in the 1850s and 1860s and ‘persistence’ afterwards. Meanwhile, 
for the post-Rebellion era, the lijin, as an indirect tax, should be responsive to the local economic 
conditions if  I take the postwar recovery into consideration. 
 
Secondly, I discuss the fiscal structure per se – how warfare led to population loss, which facilitated 
the recession of  agricultural production and decline of  land taxation. The prefectures with greater 
loss would have more urgent needs to generate the lijin revenue as a compensation. Finally, I 
introduced how the lijin revenue was spent. In a long run the lijin would strengthen the local 
autonomy and I offer evidence on local industrialization and representative politics during the 
New Policy Decade (1900s). 
 
4.1. Institutional Expansion and Persistence 
Considering the two-phase development of  the lijin taxation over time I provide more detailed 
evidence. Given the limitation of  primary materials it is impossible to track the formation of  each 
lijin station and construct a panel dataset in number of  stations. However, the text in the Financial 
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Reports implies the time for a prefecture to operate the lijin institutions for the first time. I will 
flexibly use certain cross sections in the analysis below. 
 
I firstly investigate the expansion of  the lijin institutions during the Rebellion. I count the battles 
and generate new count variables such as Taiping Duration (Dec.1850-Dec.1856), Taiping Duration 
(Jan.1857-Dec.1860), etc. and use them to predict whether there were the lijin operations within 
four years. Table 6 provides the results of  logistic regressions with Lijin Dummy for a specific year 
as the dependent variable. All columns show that more battles were linked to a higher probability 
for the lijin taxation to arise.27 
 
Then I examine the post-Rebellion persistence of  the lijin taxation. After the Rebellion, the Qing 
central government advocated the abolition of  the lijin system but was fiercely resisted at all local 
levels. Under a compromise the lijin bureaus and stations became regular institutions in the name 
of  financing post-war recovery and local defence. In the following decades, the lijin system showed 
its great inertia: most stations stayed intact, and new stations did emerge because of  local 
institutional learning under new fiscal constraints.28 However, as Figure 4 indicates, the spatial 
variation of  the lijin institutions took shape during the Rebellion, and further changes were merely 
fine-tuning. I regress the density of  main lijin stations in the 1900s to the lijin dummy for a specific 
year during the Rebellion and check whether an early lijin introduction led to heavier lijin taxation 
in the later phase. The results are in Table 7. In Columns 1 and 2, only 34 prefectures introduced 
the lijin by 1856 and the long-run prospect was far from clear. By contrast, the remaining columns 
show that an early lijin introduction predicts the density of  main stations in the ‘persistence’ phase 
well. In Column 6 for example, if  a prefecture had introduced the lijin system by 1864, the density 
of  the main lijin stations in the 1900s would increase by 0.101, which means 1.2 extra main lijin 
stations given the median prefectural land size. 
 
 
27 The conclusion holds if  I change the measures for the Taiping Warfare. Results are robust no matter how I set 
control variables. 
28 For example, the northwestern Gansu province witnessed a rapid expansion of  the lijin institutions during the 
1870s because of  the fiscal needs to suppress the Northwestern Ethnic (Muslim) Rebellion and support postwar 
recovery (Luo, 1936). 
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Besides, in the ‘persistence’ phase I expect the post-war economic conditions to impact the scale 
of  the lijin taxation, too. There are few indicators about economic conditions at the prefectural 
level, and I use the only available data, population density in 1880 and 1910 (Cao, 2001) to proxy 
them. Results are given in Table A.5. The prefectural population density in either 1880 or 1910 
predicts the scale of  the lijin taxation very well, no matter whether I add controls. 
 
4.2. The Decline of  Land Taxation 
This section focuses on the Qing fiscal revenue structure. As implied in Figure 2 the Qing fiscal 
regime was under great pressure: when the military spending increased rapidly, the dominant land 
tax revenue shrunk sharply because the Taiping warfare led to the stagnation of  agricultural 
production. Firstly, thousands of  soldiers and commoners died of  the armed conflicts every year, 
and many people fled from the warzone (Li and Lin, 2015); the insufficient labour input 
constrained the labour-intensive agricultural production. Meanwhile the short-sighted Taiping 
regime was extractive, and agricultural infrastructure and institutions, like irrigation and short-term 
lending system, were not well maintained. After all, the warfare per se meant high uncertainty and 
insecurity for both landlords and peasants. 
 
Agricultural stagnation and the consequential lack of  land taxation were an indispensable condition 
for the rise of  the lijin. If  agricultural production was normal, and the traditional land taxation 
system was run smoothly, the Qing officials could appropriate the existing land tax revenues for 
urgent military use.29 However in fact, the national level of  land taxation shrunk by nearly 50%, 
and such withering of  land taxation in the warzone pushed the local governments to turn to tax 
the commercial activities. I further propose that given other factors constant, the prefectures with 
heavier pre-Rebellion land tax burden would establish more lijin stations when facing the warfare, 
as the lijin revenue could serve as the substitute of  land tax revenue. I verify this channel with the 
existing population and taxation data (Cao, 2001; Liang, 1980). Table 8 examines the link from 
population density change to the lijin taxation. This evidence is implicit as we must assume that 
population was proportional to agricultural output (Li, 2002). All columns give significant results 
 
29 In fact, many of  them did so in the initial phase of  the Rebellion (Zhou, 2006). 
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that meet our expectation: more severe population decline from 1851 to 1880 was linked to a larger 
scale of  lijin taxation.30 
 
Then I employ the pre-Rebellion land tax revenue data (Liang, 1980) and examine whether the lijin 
compensated land tax. I consider adding an interaction between the pre-Rebellion land tax and the 
Taiping impact, and the specification is 
 
Lijini = γ0 + γ1 Land Taxi + γ2 Taipingi + γ3 Land Taxi * Taipingi + W’i γ + εi 
 
where i denotes prefectures. Land Taxi denotes the per capita land tax revenue in 1820 – the only 
year we have data – for prefecture i. W’i consists of  the aforementioned control variables. εi denotes 
the error term. The standard error is robust and clustered at the provincial level. γ3 is the coefficient 
of  interest. Results are presented in Table 9. The coefficients for the pre-Rebellion land tax and 
the Taiping impact are not robust as one correlates the other and the interaction intervenes. 
However, the coefficients for the interaction in all columns are positive and significant at 1% level, 
implying that the Taiping impact would strengthen the role of  the lijin as a substitute for land tax. 
For the prefectures with heavier land taxation before the Rebellion, the warfare would push them 
to generate more alternative revenue – the lijin – to make ends meet and to finance the urgent 
military actions.31 
 
4.3. The Consequences of  Lijin Taxation 
To understand how the lijin taxation led to unprecedented local autonomy I offer evidence from 
the expenditure side and draw general economic and political implications in this section. During 
the Rebellion, the lijin was dominantly invested in military activities. This is supported by qualitative 
evidence (Luo, 1936; He, 1981; Chen, 1992, 2010; Zhou, 2000; Ni, 2017) although we cannot 
obtain micro-level data on this argument. If  I assume the spatial variation of  military investment 
to persist for decades after the Rebellion, the provincial data by Zhou (2000) can offer suggestive 
 
30 I only obtain cross-sectional population data for two years after the Rebellion, 1880 and 1910. Results in Table 8 
are robust when I change the measures of  the lijin taxation. 
31 For all columns, the joint F-tests for γ1, γ2 and γ3 reject the null hypothesis. Besides, the conclusion here holds if  I 
change the measures for the lijin taxation. 
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evidence. Figure A.11 presents the scattered plots of  the military budget for establishing modern 




Besides long-lasting military investment, local governments had more diversified spending pattern 
such as the increasing investment in modern industries (Zhou, 2000; Halsey, 2013). The Self-
strengthening Movement (1860s-1890s) (洋务运动) was the most influential economic campaign 
as a reflection of  local fiscal autonomy from the expenditure side. Although Fairbank (1980) 
regarded it as a Chinese response to the Western presence by strengthening China’s defence 
capacities, the indigenous condition – sufficient local fiscal autonomy – was a prerequisite. The 
Qing central state almost played no role in this campaign while the key actors were dominantly 
local governors who controlled the considerable lijin revenue (Wu, 2001). Since the 1860s they 
established numerous modern enterprises in both heavy and light industries. Plenty of  qualitative 
evidence shows that those enterprises had direct links to the local lijin finance, such as Anqing 
Arsenal by Zengguofan, Shanghai/Suzhou/Nanjing Arsenals, Tianjin/Shanghai Business 
Telegram Bureau, and Steamship Business Bureau by Li Hongzhang, Fuzhou Shipyard by Zuo 
Zongtang, Canton Machinery Bureau by Ruilin, etc. (Wright, 1962; Zhou, 2000; Xu and Wu, 2000). 
More importantly there was a spillover effect from the official-led to private firms in the final years 
of  the Qing Empire because of  technological diffusion and introduction of  modern infrastructure 
(Wu, 1985). The widespread and persistent local fiscal autonomy with the lijin as a back-up force 
played a crucial role in this process, the first wave of  industrial modernization in a bottom-up way. 
 
To verify the link between the lijin taxation and local industrialization, I compile the industrial 
dataset by Du (1991) and locate the recorded 1,205 industrial firms founded between 1860 to 1911. 
I aggregate them at the prefectural level and calculate the density of  firms for each prefecture. 
Then I conduct OLS regressions at the prefectural level and present the results in Columns 1 and 
2 of  Table 10. In Column 3 I only include the heavy industries (machinery, chemicals, 
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infrastructure, transport, fuel and mineral) and the significance is robust.32 Here I estimate the 
marginal effect of  the lijin taxation on local industrialization with Column 2. If  the density of  the 
lijin stations increased by one unit, the density of  the modern industrial firms would increase by 
4.074; it means that an extra main lijin station would bring four modern industrial firms to this 
prefecture. 
 
Local Representative Politics 
As I mention above, the independent lijin revenue was autonomously spent at the local level. This 
considerable expenditure led to growing investment in both military and civil affairs, and more 
importantly, the local fiscal autonomy intertwined with awareness of  political self-determination 
and further facilitated the withering of  the central authorities and the rise of  local political powers 
in the final decade of  the Qing Empire. This part employs the 1908 provincial parliament election 
information by Zhang (2013). From 1900, the Qing central state launched a series of  political 
reforms including the abolishment of  the Civil Service Examinations, the administrative, military, 
and legal reforms and the radical ‘preparations for constitutionalism’. One important aspect of  
the ‘preparations’ for the central state was to recognize the active role of  local elites in regional 
affairs and promote the establishment of  provincial parliaments (谘议局) by civil elections (Xiao, 
1999; Hou, 2011). Although the central state set quotas for provinces, the election within a 
province was highly competitive, and prefectures with strong military, fiscal and intellectual 
capacities had greater voices in a provincial parliament by winning more seats. I assume that the 
lijin, as an important aspect of  fiscal autonomy, proxies well for local political self-determination 
and use the prefectural data to examine this link. 
 
By referring to Zhang (2013) I sort the 1,643 successful candidates by prefecture and generate a 
count variable, the number of  representatives, at the prefectural level. Then I regress it to the scale 
of  the lijin taxation, and Table 10 exhibits the results. Columns 4 and 5 are results of  Poisson 
regressions; Column 6 considers the population in 1910 and uses the weighted number of  
 
32 For Columns 1 to 3, using Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees or Weighted Annual Lijin Revenue as the independent 
variable gives robust results. 
28 
representatives as the dependent variable. All three columns give significant results.33 Regarding 
the magnitude, I take Column 6 as an example: if  the density of  main lijin stations increased by 
one units (1.2 stations on average), there would be 2.9 more representatives given the median 
prefectural population (median = 5). 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Political disorder plays a crucial role in strengthening the fiscal capacity for a state, and this article 
chooses the chaotic 19th-century Qing China to study the relationship between the internal 
rebellion and the rise of  the indirect taxation. This article tries to offer fresh views on the 
transitional process of  China’s fiscal modernization by highlighting the pivotal role of  an 
indigenous shock, the Taiping Rebellion. Empirical evidence at the prefectural level verifies the 
strong link from the Taiping Rebellion to the rise and persistence of  local indirect taxation. 
Shrinking primary sector and declining land taxation were a key channel inducing local 
governments to tax on short-distance trade and mitigate the fiscal constraints. After the Rebellion, 
the self-serving local lijin institutions persisted for decades and the autonomous lijin served as an 
indispensable fiscal resource at the local level. This article draws general implications by linking 
fiscal capacity to industrialization and representative politics in the final years of  the Qing Empire. 
With above findings in the Chinese context, this article speaks to the well-recognized fiscal-military 
theory and rethinks over the role of  internal political disorder and the justifiability of  indirect 
taxation, both of  which are under-explored in the current literature. 
  
 
33 The Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees or Weighted Annual Lijin Revenue predicts robust results. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1. The Taiping Impact at the Prefectural Level 
 
Panel A. Taiping Dummy 1            Panel B. Taiping Dummy 2 
 
       
 
 
Panel C. Taiping Duration            Panel D. Taiping Severity 
 
       
 
Source: see the text and Table 1. 
  
36 




1. If  the records were in copper coins, I convert them into silver taels with the exchange rate in Luo (1936). 
2. The land tax revenue does not include the tax in kind. 
3. For some years I cannot obtain data for salt tax but can infer from regional records (Ni, 2013, 2017). For example, 
if  I obtain numbers for Lianghuai (两淮) salt region (For the Qing ‘salt region’ institutions see Ni (2013)), I will 
estimate the national salt tax revenue proportionally based on earlier records (i.e. the 1840s’ records indicate that 
the annual revenue for the Lianghuai was 42% of  the national salt tax revenue). Hence I estimate the national 
numbers based on the Lianghuai ones. 
4. For years with missing data, case by case I construct exponential, logarithmic or linear models with existing data 
points, and fill in the blanks with fitted values. 
5. The figure does not present data after 1894 as another exogenous shock, the Sino-Japanese War, led to further 
institutional transitions. 
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Figure 3. The Lijin Taxation at the Prefectural Level 
 
Panel A. Dummy for Provincial Bureaus 
 
          
 
Panel B. Density of  Main Stations      Panel C. Density of  Additional Stations 
 
     
 
Note: 
1. Panel C provides an incomplete image because four provinces (Hubei, Sichuan, Guizhou and Shanxi) lacked 
relevant records. 









Source: see the text. 
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Table 1. Calculating Methods for Independent and Dependent Variables 
 




Taiping Dummy 1 
Taiping Dummy 1 = 1 if  impacted (including passing-by, mild governance, 
armed conflicts and large-scale battles) 
Taiping Dummy 2 
Taiping Dummy 2 = 1 if  impacted (armed conflicts and large-scale battles 
only) 
Taiping Duration 
Taiping Duration = n if  a prefecture was impacted (armed conflicts and large-
scale battles only) for n months 
Taiping Severity 
Taiping Severity = ∑ 𝑠𝑖183𝑖=1  / 1000 
where 𝑠𝑖 stands for the severity score (0, 1, 2, 10 or 100) for the month i, 
and there were 183 months in total (Dec. 1850 to Feb. 1866); 
100 points: large-scale battles with 10,000+ soldiers at least from either side 
and followed by severe casualties (usually 1,000+); 10 points: small-scale 
armed conflicts; 2 points: passing-by of  the Taipings; 1 point: mild 
governance by the Taipings; 0 points: no impact recorded 
Dependent 
Variable 
Density of  Main 
Lijin Stations 
Density of  Main Lijin Stations = no. of  main stations / land size in km2 * 1000 
Weighted Number 
of  Lijin 
Employees 
For Southeastern provinces, Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees = (30* no. of  
provincial bureau + 35*no. of  main stations) / land size in km2 *1000 
For the rest of  China Proper, Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees = (30* no. 
of  provincial bureau + 18*no. of  main stations) / land size in km2 *1000 
Weighted Amount 
of  Annual Lijin 
Revenue 
Weighted Amount of  Annual Lijin Revenue = average provincial revenue (1890-
1899) in 103 silver taels * (no. of  prefectural employees / no. of  provincial employees) 
/ land size in km2 * 1000 
 




Table 2. Calculating Methods for Other Variables 
 
Category Variable Definition and Calculating Method 
Geographical 
conditions 
Coast Coast = 1 for a prefecture by the coastline 
River River = 1 for a prefecture by the Yangzi River or the Great Canal 
Latitude Latitude of  the centre of  a prefecture in degree 





Political Control Distance to the nearest provincial capital in km2 
Ln(1820 Population) Log of  population in 1820 in 103 
Distance to a Custom 




Treaty Port Duration 
Number of  years for a prefecture to own treaty port(s) for foreign 
trade till 1911 
Other Rebellions 
Dummy Variables for the Nian Rebellions (former and latter 
stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, Southwestern 
Ethnic Rebellion, Lilan Rebellion, Northwestern Ethnic 






Dummy Variables for the 1st and 2nd Opium Wars, the Sino-
French War and the Sino-Japanese War 
Severity of  Natural Disasters 
The overall impact of  natural disasters (both droughts and 
floods): 
Severity = ∑ |𝑑𝑖 − 3|1911𝑖=1851  for a prefecture; The 𝑑𝑖 stands for 
the score (1 to 5 points) for the year i; 
5 points: severe drought; 4 points: light drought; 3 points: no 
drought or flood; 2 points: light flood; 1 point: severe flood 
Population Density Change 
1851-80 
Δ Population Density = (Population in 1880 in 103 – Population in 1851 
in 103) / Land size in km2 
1820 Land Tax 
Land taxation burden (in both currency and kind) for a prefecture 
in 1820 in 103 silver taels; Grains are converted into silver taels 
using the prices for the specific region in 1820 
1820 Land Tax Per Capita 1820 Land Tax p.c. = 1820 Land Tax / 1820 Population in 103 
Density of  Industrial Firms 
Density of  Industrial Firms = Number of  Industrial Firms set up 
between 1860 and 1911 / Land size in km2 * 1000 
Density of  Heavy Industrial 
Firms 
Same as above; only heavy industries included – machinery, 
chemicals, infrastructure, fuel & mineral, and transport 
Number of  Provincial 
Parliament (Ziyiju) 
Representatives 
Count variable for the number of  representatives in provincial 
parliament (Ziyiju, 谘议局) in 1908 
Weighted Number of  
Provincial Parliament (Ziyiju) 
Representatives 
Weighted Number = Number / Population in 1910 in 103 * 1000 
 
Notes: 
1. The values of  Coast and River are generated from Tan (1982); those of  Latitude, Ln(Size), Political Control and Distance 
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to a Custom are from CHGIS (Version 6) by Harvard University. The locations of  customs are identified in Ni 
(2017). 
2. The population data is by Cao (2001). 
3. The information on the treaty ports is from Yan (1955). 
4. The information on other rebellions is from Guo (1989) and that on international wars is from Spence (1990). 
5. The severity of  natural disasters is generated with the records by the Chinese Academy of  Meteorological Sciences 
(CAMS) (1981). 
6. The taxation data of  1820 is from Liang (1980). When I do the conversion from grains to silver taels, I refer to 
the price information for grains in the Qing Grain Price Database by the Institute of  Modern History, Academia 
Sinica in Taiwan (http://mhdb.mh.sinica.edu.tw/foodprice/). 
7. The data on the industrial firms from 1860 to 1911 is by Du (1991). The data on the 1908 provincial parliament 
representatives is by Zhang (2013). I locate every firm and representative into a prefecture with the information 
in Tan (1982). 
8. I generate other variables such as population density and Lijin dummy for a specific year in Parts 3 and 4. They 
are self-explanatory by names. 
















Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Taiping Dummy 1 0.139*    
 (0.074)    
Taiping Dummy 2  0.209*   
  (0.100)   
Taiping Duration   0.042***  
   (0.010)  
Taiping Severity    0.637*** 
    (0.166) 
Constant 0.187*** 0.184*** 0.184*** 0.213*** 
 (0.045) (0.041) (0.040) (0.044) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 









Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Taiping 0.089*    0.120*    
Dummy 1 (0.045)    (0.067)    
Taiping  0.146*    0.115**   
Dummy 2  (0.075)    (0.052)   
Taiping   0.030***    0.021**  
Duration   (0.007)    (0.009)  
Taiping    0.404***    0.239** 
Severity    (0.114)    (0.114) 
Ln(Size) -0.151** -0.150*** -0.155*** -0.158*** -0.152*** -0.152*** -0.155*** -0.156*** 
 (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048) 
Coast 0.345** 0.347** 0.331** 0.306** 0.217 0.193 0.183 0.168 
 (0.154) (0.136) (0.123) (0.126) (0.132) (0.123) (0.115) (0.116) 
River 0.222** 0.214** 0.173** 0.160* 0.185** 0.179** 0.156* 0.156* 
 (0.092) (0.089) (0.082) (0.081) (0.066) (0.066) (0.075) (0.079) 
Latitude -0.004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.004 0.016** 0.015** 0.015** 0.012* 
 (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln(1820 0.060** 0.050* 0.047* 0.065** 0.080*** 0.082*** 0.078** 0.095*** 
Population) (0.026) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) (0.021) (0.023) (0.029) (0.030) 
Political -0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000 -0.000 
Control (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance to 0.000 0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a Custom (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treaty Port     0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
Duration     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Other 
Rebellions 
    Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.265** 1.268** 1.286** 1.311** 0.609* 0.664* 0.686* 0.713** 
 (0.546) (0.535) (0.519) (0.517) (0.329) (0.323) (0.326) (0.334) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.368 0.382 0.420 0.410 0.584 0.583 0.596 0.588 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 










Weighted Number of  Lijin Employees 
OLS 
Weighted Annual Lijin Revenue 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Taiping Severity 25.340*** 9.924* 40.592** 16.350** 
 (6.299) (5.098) (16.632) (6.774) 
Ln(Size)  -4.588***  -7.161* 
  (1.488)  (3.611) 
Coast  6.270  9.648** 
  (4.117)  (3.544) 
River  6.157*  15.758 
  (2.936)  (9.924) 
Latitude  0.202  0.824 
  (0.254)  (0.716) 
Ln(1820  2.997***  4.024* 
Population)  (1.031)  (2.298) 
Political  -0.010  -0.008 
Control  (0.007)  (0.010) 
Distance to  -0.001  0.005 
a Custom  (0.003)  (0.007) 
Treaty Port  0.222***  0.195** 
Duration  (0.058)  (0.074) 
Other Rebellions  Yes  Yes 
Constant 5.791*** 25.484** 4.834** 18.483* 
 (1.493) (9.049) (2.251) (10.442) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.203 0.640 0.170 0.548 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 









Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2nd Opium War 0.286     
Dummy (0.242)     
Sino-French War  -0.133    
Dummy  (0.204)    
Sino-Japanese War   -0.630   
Dummy   (0.488)   
Number of    0.008  
International Wars    (0.114)  
Severity of     -0.004** 
Natural Disasters     (0.002) 
Ln(Size) -0.151*** -0.160*** -0.149*** -0.155*** -0.162*** 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.048) (0.051) (0.049) 
Coast 0.156 0.111 0.158 0.150 0.184 
 (0.130) (0.127) (0.122) (0.104) (0.120) 
River 0.186** 0.204** 0.200** 0.201** 0.192** 
 (0.076) (0.078) (0.075) (0.072) (0.069) 
Latitude -0.006 0.000 0.003 0.012* 0.014** 
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln(1820 0.102*** 0.108*** 0.103*** 0.105*** 0.099*** 
Population) (0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.033) (0.028) 
Political -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000** 
Control (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance to 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
a Custom (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Treaty Port  0.017*** 0.017*** 0.006* 0.006*** 
Duration  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
Other Rebellions Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 1.161** 1.055*** 0.884** 0.682* 0.934** 
 (0.407) (0.365) (0.332) (0.341) (0.364) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.463 0.535 0.568 0.571 0.582 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘treaty port durations’ for Columns (2) to (3) are different as the wars broke out in different decades. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 
Southwestern Ethnic Rebellion, Lilan Rebellion, Northwestern Ethnic Rebellion and Boxer Rebellion. For Columns 
(1) to (3), I only include rebellions in the same era as the relevant international war. 
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Lijin Dummy for 1860 
(1) 
Lijin Dummy for 1864 
(2) 
Lijin Dummy for 1868 
(3) 
Taiping Duration 1850-56 0.192*   
 (0.112)   
Taiping Duration 1857-60  1.199*  
  (0.649)  
Taiping Duration 1861-64   0.540*** 
   (0.206) 
Ln(Size) 0.419 0.187 0.280 
 (0.394) (0.394) (0.410) 
Coast -0.019 0.276 -0.085 
 (0.609) (0.661) (0.868) 
River -1.225** 1.538*** 1.564*** 
 (0.578) (0.315) (0.350) 
Latitude -0.034 -0.111* -0.143** 
 (0.054) (0.063) (0.064) 
Ln(1820 0.395 0.916*** 0.811*** 
Population) (0.246) (0.286) (0.268) 
Political -0.005** -0.005 -0.005 
Control (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Distance to -0.003** -0.001 -0.001 
a Custom (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Other Rebellions Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -4.560 -3.396 -2.389 
 (2.809) (2.997) (3.281) 
Obs. 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.197 0.291 0.308 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For logistic regressions, I report the pseudo 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 
Southwestern Ethnic Rebellion and Lilan Rebellion. For Columns (1) to (3) I only include rebellions of  the 










Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lijin Dummy 0.314 0.129       
For 1856 (0.202) (0.076)       
Lijin Dummy   0.228** 0.118*     
For 1860   (0.081) (0.059)     
Lijin Dummy     0.278*** 0.101***   
For 1864     (0.082) (0.035)   
Lijin Dummy       0.269*** 0.110*** 
For 1868       (0.080) (0.037) 
Ln(Size)  -0.158***  -0.164***  -0.160***  -0.161*** 
  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Coast  0.177  0.155  0.149  0.154 
  (0.115)  (0.123)  (0.119)  (0.120) 
River  0.184***  0.216***  0.176**  0.175** 
  (0.063)  (0.069)  (0.074)  (0.073) 
Latitude  0.013*  0.011  0.013*  0.014* 
  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
Ln(1820  0.097***  0.093**  0.088**  0.087** 
Population)  (0.033)  (0.036)  (0.033)  (0.033) 
Political  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
Control  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance to  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
a Custom  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
Treaty Port  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
Duration  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Other 
Rebellions 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.221*** 0.698* 0.180*** 0.780** 0.108*** 0.750** 0.106*** 0.723** 
 (0.046) (0.338) (0.052) (0.317) (0.033) 0.321 (0.035) (0.313) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.079 0.581 0.085 0.588 0.136 0.583 0.125 0.585 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 










Lijin Dummy for 1880 
OLS 
Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Population Density -11.654** -9.591* -2.069*** -1.284** 
Change 1851-80 (4.627) (4.941) (0.456) (0.548) 
Ln(Size)  0.055  -0.112** 
  (0.324)  (0.046) 
Coast  0.794  0.150 
  (0.667)  (0.110) 
River  1.523***  0.137* 
  (0.585)  (0.072) 
Latitude  -0.107*  0.000 
  (0.059)  (0.006) 
Ln(1820  1.274***  0.050** 
Population)  (0.249)  (0.022) 
Political  -0.004  -0.000 
Control  (0.003)  (0.000) 
Distance to  0.000  0.000 
a Custom  (0.001)  (0.000) 
Treaty Port  -0.048  0.017*** 
Duration  (0.063)  (0.003) 
Other Rebellions Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 0.572* -4.424 0.194*** 0.893** 
 (0.322) (3.226) (0.038) (0.351) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.064 0.333 0.291 0.601 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2; For logistic regressions, I report the pseudo R2. 
The ‘treaty port duration’ for Columns (1) and (2) refers to the number of  years for a prefecture to own treaty port(s) 
for foreign trade till 1880, and that for Columns (3) and (4) refers to the number of  years till 1911. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 









Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
1820 Land Tax 0.019 -0.175 0.158 0.074 0.356 0.270 0.448* 0.366* 
Per Capita (0.284) (0.265) (0.265) (0.183) (0.246) (0.174) (0.254) (0.201) 
Taiping Dummy 1 -0.186* -0.102       
 (0.095) (0.060)       
Taiping Dummy 2   -0.169* -0.120**     
   (0.094) (0.052)     
Taiping Duration     -0.016 -0.013   
     (0.012) (0.008)   
Taiping Severity       -0.310*** -0.294*** 
       (0.102) (0.065) 
1820Tax * D1 2.438*** 1.873***       
 (0.796) (0.414)       
1820Tax * D2   2.517*** 1.699***     
   (0.732) (0.334)     
1820Tax*Duration     0.320*** 0.208***   
     (0.059) (0.037)   
1820Tax*Severity       5.238*** 3.482*** 
       (0.519) (0.766) 
Geographic 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Conditions 
Initial Political 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Conditions 
Treaty Port  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.005*** 
Duration  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Other 
Rebellions 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.185** 0.460 0.169** 0.553* 0.151*** 0.596* 0.158*** 0.635* 
 (0.066) (0.304) (0.059) (0.317) (0.050) (0.329) (0.048) (0.344) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.334 0.693 0.366 0.683 0.437 0.690 0.473 0.695 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘geographical conditions’ include the log of  land size, the coast dummy, the river dummy and the latitude. The 
‘initial political conditions’ include the log of  population in 1820, the degree of  political control and the distance to a 
custom. The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui 
Rebellion, Southwestern Ethnic Rebellion, Lilan Rebellion, Northwestern Ethnic Rebellion and Boxer Rebellion. 
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Number of  
Representa-
tives 
Density of  Industrial Firms Number of  Representatives 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Density of  Main 5.205** 4.074** 1.643** 0.523*** 0.454*** 2.552** 
Lijin Stations (2.415) (1.728) (0.641) (0.110) (0.129) (1.065) 
Ln(Size)  0.207 0.059  0.195** 0.582 
  (0.244) (0.101)  (0.077) (0.487) 
Coast  -1.049 -0.544  -0.225** -1.024 
  (0.857) (0.349)  (0.114) (0.631) 
River  0.515 0.202  -0.172** -0.888* 
  (0.425) (0.177)  (0.074) (0.494) 
Latitude  0.078 0.029  0.008 0.071 
  (0.049) (0.019)  (0.009) (0.060) 
Ln(1820  -0.329 -0.120    
Population)  (0.271) (0.108)    
Ln(1880     0.620*** -1.263*** 
Population)     (0.063) (0.343) 
Political  -0.000 -0.000  -0.002*** -0.003 
Control  (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.004) 
Distance to  -0.000 -0.000    
a Custom  (0.001) (0.000)    
Treaty Port  0.064 0.033*  0.002 0.012 
Duration  0.041 (0.018)  (0.003) (0.017) 
Other 
Rebellions 
 Yes Yes    
Constant -0.835 -3.301 -1.017 1.707*** -4.377*** 6.117 
 (0.528) (2.456) (0.941) (0.097) (0.555) (5.691) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.273 0.398 0.429 - - 0.127 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 




A.  Data Collection for the Taiping Rebellion and the Lijin Taxation 
 




1. This is one of  the most important memorials during the Taiping Rebellion, the Memorial on the General Situation of  
Jinling Recovery by Yang Yuebin (杨岳斌等奏报克复金陵大概情形折) on the 16th June 1864 (lunar calendar). It 
describes the fierce battles since the start of  June, including which strategy the generals implemented, which route 
they took and how long it took to retake the city. It is kept as the No. 1864-261 memorial in the Vol.26 of  FHAC 
(1996); the text has been retyped. 
2. Key information is highlighted: at the night of  recovery on the 16th, ‘tens of  thousands of ’ Taipings were killed; 
on the Qing side, from the end of  May to the middle June 1864, over 2,000 Qing soldiers sacrificed and over 
4,000 were injured. 
Source: FHAC (1996). 
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1. This is how the lijin stations were listed in the Jiangsu Financial Report 1908 (the budget part of  Suzhou division). 
The highlighted areas indicate the names of  a main station and the number of  its additional stations. This is taken 
from p. 217 in the Vol.16 of  BL (2006). 
2. Figure A.3. introduces how I locate the lijin stations. 
Source: BL (2006). 
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1. Here is an example on how I obtain and compile data. The lijin stations for three rich Lower Yangzi prefectures, 
Suzhou, Changzhu and Zhenjiang, were supervised by the Suzhou Division of  Jiangsu Province. Fortunately, 
many stations took the names of  towns and streets, which can be precisely tracked even in today’s map. This 
figure shows the locations of  the main stations and the numbers of  additional ones in cluster. 
2. This is an example to show how the layout of  stations was well rationalized: both the water and land transport 
networks were taken into consideration so that the lijin agencies could use as few stations as they could to 
maximize their revenue. Although the Taipings might occupy certain towns from time to time, the local 
governments still taxed on the short-distance trades which were still active. 
Source: BL (2006) and Figure A.2. 
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B.  Were the Taiping Marches Random? 
This section offers qualitative and quantitative evidence about the randomness of  the Taiping 
military activities among provinces and prefectures. It is hard to predict that such a devastating 
rebellion must break out in Guangxi. There are various hypotheses for its outbreak: significant 
climate changes since 1800 (Liu, 1982; CAMS, 1981), increasing opium imports which shifted 
China’s long-standing surplus to deficit in international trade and the ensuing silver deflation (Lin, 
2006), the founder Hong Xiuquan’s personal background, religious gifts and strong charisma 
(Spence, 1996) and possible land conflicts between the local and the Hakka immigrants (Platt, 
2012). However, none of  them implied that Guangxi had the highest probability to give birth to a 
rebellion which served the greatest threat to the Qing’s rule. Hence regarding the fiscal story that 
I outline, the outbreak of  the Taiping Rebellion was an exogenous event. 
 
Then we should rethink over whether the routes of  the Taiping troops were random during the 
183 months. Intuitively the rebels would firstly attack the most prosperous regions for resources, 
but the facts greatly deviate from this idea considering the complex geographical and political 
conditions. Here I provide three clarifications about the randomness of  the Taiping marching 
routes. 
 
The first is that the Taiping routes dynamically interacted with both the Qing defence system and 
the quality and characters of  local magistrates and military officers; such factors had no 
relationship with local economic conditions. For example, all Middle Yangzi provincial capitals, 
Changsha, Wuchang, Nanchang and Anqing, were regional economic centres by the Yangzi River 
with very dense water and land transport networks. However, due to the varying capacities of  the 
local Qing troops, these four prefectures had completely different endings. In 1852 Changsha was 
under intense attack from the main Taiping force for three months but it never fell into the hands 
of  the Taipings because of  its tenacious local soldiers (CMH, 2003), and for the years after 1853 
Changsha was never disturbed by the Taiping forces (Luo, 1937). There was a similar story for 
Nanchang: the tough Qing troops fought for three months and suffered huge loss of  resource and 
population but Nanchang never fell; after the Western Expedition, even when the entire Jiangxi 
was under the Taiping rule, Nanchang was still at the Qing’s hands (Guo, 1989). As a comparison 
Wuchang had no such good luck. At the end of  1852 the officers of  Yuezhou, a place in the upper 
reaches of  Wuchang (indicated in Figure A.4), abandoned the town and escaped; the Taipings 
quickly sailed down the River without a battle and left no time for Wuchang to defend (FHAC, 
1996). Wuchang soon fell in early 1853 and its surrounding regions were occupied by the Taipings 
from time to time for the next years. Besides, the downstream Anqing’s story was the most 
miserable. Due to the slow local response, the city was occupied, the governor was killed (FHAC, 
1996) and Anqing became one of  the most devastated regions by the Taiping forces for eight 
consecutive years. The cases of  the above four Yangzi provincial capitals imply that the Taiping 







Figure A.4. Randomness of  the Taiping Impacts in the Middle Yangzi Region 
 
 
Source: see the text. 
 
The second clarification for the randomness of  the Rebellion is that the Taiping expansion 
strategies were shaped by its own political conditions and the characters of  its kings and generals. 
Figure A.5 provides details on the long marches of  the Taiping troops. For example, the successful 
Western Expedition starting from 1853 won the vast and prosperous Middle Yangzi regions for 
the Taipings. However, the Tianjing Incident, with self-weakening power division and bloody 
massacres in 1856, completely stagnated the actions of  the front lines. Thousands of  soldiers were 
recalled. The Taiping regime almost immediately lost its best opportunity of  expansion, and its 
Hubei and Jiangxi territories were soon retaken by the Qing side. This political event was surely 
unanticipated and exogenous to the indirect taxation that I study. Another powerful piece of  
evidence is the Shi Dakai’s March from 1857. After the power struggle with the founder Hong 
Xiuquan, the King Shi Dakai broke up with Hong, left the capital with several thousand 
subordinates and marched westward. Through the long march Shi avoided direct conflicts with 
both the Qing forces and other rebellious groups in southern China such as the Heaven and Earth 









Figure A.5. Long Marches of  the Taiping Troops 
 




1. The provincial borders are by CHGIS (Version 6) by Harvard University. 
Source: Guo (1989); FHAC (1996). 
 
The last clarification is that the Taiping impact on a prefecture was linked to the resource 
endowments and geographical conditions that had no connection to local economy. For example 
in Panel A of  Figure A.6, in the winter of  1852 the main Taiping force abandoned attacking 
Changsha after a failed three-month siege and marched north to the Dongting Lake, one of  the 
largest lakes in southern China. There were two equally important economic centres to the east 
and west of  the Lake, Yuezhou and Changde respectively. The Taipings planned to march towards 
Changde along the side of  the Lake; however, the boatmen at the Linzi Port donated several 
thousand boats to the Taiping forces. Hence they changed the plan, quickly sailed across the Lake 
to the east and conquered Yuezhou instantly. On the contrary, the prefectures to the west of  the 
Dongting Lake, like Changde and Lizhou, were hardly ever disturbed and served one of  the few 
Qing enclaves in the Middle Yangzi regions during the heyday of  the Taiping regime. This example 
indicates how the accidental factors determined the routes while they had no relationship with 
economic activities. 
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Another illustration is from the Yellow River in northern China. During the Northern Expedition 
in 1853 the Taiping troops passed the border between Anhui and Henan and marched along the 
south bank of  the Yellow River. Battles were recorded in Guide and Kaifeng prefectures. However, 
the Taipings found coal ships by accident in Gongxian34 and thus crossed the River to conquer 
the north bank. Thus Gongxian became a pivot: in the south bank of  the River, the prefectures to 
the west of  Gongxian, such as Henan and Shaanzhou, were not disturbed at all; in the north bank 
for a comparison, with Gongxian as a cutoff, prefectures to the east like Weihui and Caozhou were 
not impacted while there were fierce sieges in the ones to the west, like Huaiqing and Pingyang. 
However, there is no evidence to imply a systemic difference in economic performance among 
these cohorts of  prefectures with Gongxian as a pivot. See Panel B of  Figure A.6. 
 
In short, rich qualitative evidence show that the Taiping shock was exogenous to the fiscal 
transitions that I focus on. Furthermore, with the prefectural dataset that this article establishes, I 
can check the randomness of  the Rebellion from the following Poisson, logistic and OLS 
regressions in Table A.1. The dependent variables are different measures of  the Taiping impacts, 
and the independent variables include the pre-Rebellion geographical, political and economic 
conditions. No factors can robustly explain the prefectural Taiping impact. 
 
Meanwhile I count the monthly battles from 1853 to 1864 and construct count variables, Taiping 
Duration (Jan.1853-Dec.1854), Taiping Duration (Jan.1855-Dec.1856), etc. for each prefecture; then I 
use Poisson regressions to check whether the intensity of  the earlier Taiping battles could predict 
the ones in years later. For all 15 regressions in Table A.2 I add province dummies. The early 
Taiping warfare in general cannot predict the warfare severity in later phases. 
  
 
34 This is a county in Henan prefecture of  Henan province. 
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Figure A.6. Randomness of  the Taiping Impacts by the Dongting Lake and Yellow River 
 








Source: see the text. 
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Table A.1. Initial Conditions and the Taiping Rebellion 
 

































Ln(Size) -0.424 0.362 -0.243 0.203 -0.635 0.472* 0.028 
 (0.535) (0.486) (0.217) (0.290) (0.506) (0.257) (0.020) 
Coast -1.303*** -1.308** -0.982* -4.158*** -2.774*** -1.856 -0.053 
 (0.466) (0.643) (0.590) (1.074) (0.746) (1.211) (0.099) 
River 1.330 0.199 0.531* 2.189** 3.240** 1.835** 0.126** 
 (0.895) (0.657) (0.306) (1.113) (1.502) (0.818) (0.049) 
Latitude -0.119 -0.153 -0.485*** -0.545** -0.382 -0.201 -0.010 
 (0.153) (0.171) (0.141) (0.247) (0.237) (0.156) (0.012) 
Longitude -0.044 -0.107 -0.102 -0.180 -0.148 0.085 0.005 
 (0.217) (0.179) (0.146) (0.283) (0.212) (0.174) (0.011) 
Ln(1820 1.009** 0.506 0.915*** 0.752 1.638** 0.331 -0.001 
Population) (0.514) (0.315) (0.321) (0.507) (0.788) (0.323) (0.025) 
Political -0.004*** -0.004** -0.002 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.000* 
Control (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) 
Distance to -0.002 0.003** -0.002 -0.006* -0.007** -0.001 -0.000 
a Custom (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.000) 
1820 Land -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 0.005*** 0.003 0.002 0.000 
Tax Rev. (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Other 
Rebellions 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Province 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.320 10.809 24.106 32.973 21.056 -5.566 -0.228 
 (25.422) (22.708) (20.855) (31.174) (24.741) (20.051) (1.123) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 266 266 266 
R-squared - - - 0.446 0.508 0.537 0.362 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2; For logistic regressions, I report the pseudo R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include White Lotus Rebellion, Tiandihui Rebellion and Xiaodaohui Rebellion. The dummy for 




































































































The entries are corresponding coefficients for key independent variables. Robust standard errors, clustered by 
province, are reported in parentheses. The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For 
all 15 regressions I add province dummies. The coefficients for province dummies and constant are not presented. 
  
61 
C. Additional Tables and Figures 
 






Source: see Table 2. 
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1. This figure plots the locations of  customs and then it measures the distances from the provincial capitals of  
Gansu, Shaanxi, Henan, Yunnan, Guizhou and Guilin, to their nearest customs. All these six provinces had no 
customs within their territories. 
2. The distances in the map are calculated by the ARCGIS. 




Figure A.9. Selected Yearly Annual Lijin Revenue at the Provincial Level 
 









1. Considering the currencies reform and price volatility during the New Policy Decade (1900s) these figures only 
cover 1853 to 1900. 
2. Panel B uses 1851 population data by Cao (2001) to generate per capita data. If  we consider the population 
changes from 1851 to 1900, the gap between severely and lightly impacted groups in Panel B should be wider. 









































































































Zhejiang Jiangxi Hunan Hubei









































































































Zhejiang Jiangxi Hunan Hubei










Figure A.10. Scattered Plots for the Lijin Taxation to the Taiping Rebellion (266 Prefectures) 
 
Panel A. Density of  Main Stations 
 
       
 
Panel B. Weighted Number of  Employees 
 
       
 
Panel C. Weighted Annual Revenue 
 
       
 
Source: see Table 1. 
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Figure A.11. Scattered Plots for the 1904 Military Budget to the Lijin Taxation (18 Provinces) 
 









1. I use 1910 population data (Cao, 2001) to generate above per capita data. 
2. The grey band represents the 95% confident interval. 
Source: see the text, Table 1 and Zhou (2000). 
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Table A.3. Types of  the Lijin Bureaus and Stations 
 
Name Provincial Bureau (省局) Main Station (正卡) Additional Station (分卡) 
Level High Middle Low 
Responsibility General supervision Tax collection 
Tax collection and 
inspection 




Jiangsu (Suzhou Div.): 24 
(plus 16 runners) 
Jiangsu (Shanghai Div.): 28 
(plus 20 runners) 
Shandong: 28 (plus 20 
runners) 










Wuku and Yanjiaqiao: 4 for 
each 
Liuhe: 5 for each 
Shashi: averagely 2.6 for 
each 




1. The Shanghai Freight Station had 76 employees as it was set by a key railway junction. 




Table A.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 




Taiping Dummy 1 266 0.538 0.500 0 1 1 
Taiping Dummy 2 266 0.368 0.483 0 0 1 
Taiping Duration 266 1.835 3.720 0 0 26 
Taiping Severity 266 0.076 0.238 0.000 0.002 2.163 
Dependent 
Variables 
Number of  Main Lijin Stations 266 2.801 3.316 0 2 20 
Number of  Lijin Employees 266 79.722 116.212 0 36 730 
Annual Lijin Revenue 266 71.150 145.552 0 19 966 
Control 
Variables 
Land Size 266 16148 19407 1270 12140 192200 
Coast 266 0.135 0.343 0 0 1 
River 266 0.184 0.388 0 0 1 
Latitude 266 30.745 5.084 19 31 43 
Longitude 266 111.580 5.872 95 112 122 
Population 1820 266 1411 1242 18 999 6663 
Population 1851 266 1603 1415 22 1128 7981 
Population 1880 266 1319 1251 27 929 6847 
Population 1910 266 1545 1416 33 1121 7577 
Political Control 266 191.621 114.097 0 187 914 
Distance to a Custom 266 261.715 213.013 0 205 1151 
Treaty Port Duration 266 4.282 13.259 0 0 68 
Nian Reb. (Former) 266 0.117 0.321 0 0 1 
Nian Reb. (Latter) 266 0.117 0.321 0 0 1 
Tiandihui Rebellion 266 0.135 0.343 0 0 1 
Xiaodaohui Rebellion 266 0.019 0.136 0 0 1 
Southwestern Ethnic Reb. 266 0.143 0.351 0 0 1 
Lilan Rebellion 266 0.090 0.287 0 0 1 
Northwestern Ethnic Reb. 266 0.064 0.245 0 0 1 
Boxer Rebellion 266 0.117 0.321 0 0 1 
1st Opium War 266 0.030 0.171 0 0 1 
2nd Opium War 266 0.026 0.160 0 0 1 
Sino-French War 266 0.019 0.136 0 0 1 
Sino-Japanese War 266 0.015 0.122 0 0 1 
Natural Disaster Severity 266 46.083 11.218 26 44 69 
1820 Land Tax Revenue 266 185.524 305.623 0 90 3056 
Number of  Industrial Firms 266 4.267 18.968 0 0 247 
Number of  Provincial Parliament 
(Ziyiju) Representatives 
266 6.474 5.723 0 5 39 
 
Note: 
1. In this table I report the counts for many variables but in the regressions I may employ the density or the weighted 
number for them. Check the calculating methods in Tables 1 and 2. 
Source: see Tables 1 and 2. 
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Density of  Main Lijin Stations 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
1880 Population Density 1.739** 1.254***   
 (0.640) (0.312)   
1910 Population Density   1.480** 0.910*** 
   (0.577) (0.261) 
Ln(Size)  -0.080  -0.092* 
  (0.051)  (0.051) 
Coast  0.061  0.088 
  (0.131)  (0.127) 
River  0.131*  0.145** 
  (0.066)  (0.066) 
Latitude  0.011**  0.011** 
  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Ln(1820  0.053  0.061* 
Population)  (0.031)  (0.031) 
Political  -0.000**  -0.000** 
Control  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Distance to  0.000  0.000 
a Custom  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Treaty Port  0.006***  0.006*** 
Duration  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Other Rebellions  Yes  Yes 
Constant 0.065 0.297 0.066 0.359 
 (0.050) 0.358 (0.051) (0.365) 
Obs. 266 266 266 266 
R-squared 0.240 0.607 0.212 0.594 
 
The entries are corresponding coefficients. Robust standard errors, clustered by province, are reported in parentheses. 
The *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level. For OLS estimates, I report the adjusted 
R2. 
The ‘other rebellions’ include Nian Rebellions (former and latter stages), Tiandihui Rebellion, Xiaodaohui Rebellion, 
Southwestern Ethnic Rebellion, Lilan Rebellion, Northwestern Ethnic Rebellion and Boxer Rebellion. 
